Ky Holland, June 5, 2026

Many people, and sometimes I have also, asked how someone who actively supports resource development, and who has spent much of a career in mining, construction, manufacturing, and oil and gas, can also be one of the more persistent critics of aspects of the Alaska LNG project developers plans and their request for a massive tax cut.

The answer is simple: supporting development of our natural gas and infrastructure does not mean suspending due diligence of the developer and their plans to insure the tax cut worth billions is necessary and structured in a practical way for the project and Alaskans.

Key Point – I know what the developer WANTs for a tax break and favorable developer terms, but at this point they have not proven to me what they NEED and how it specifically secures equity investors and necessary firm ship-or-pay market buyers. So in the absence of concrete information from the developers, we must dig for the justification we need to defend our decision to give away billions while our schools, capital projects and PFDs get cut each year, and 34,000 working age adults leave the state for better opportunities in the L48.

I want this project to succeed. Alaska needs new industries, new investment, affordable energy, and long-term economic opportunity. House District 9 business, communities, and residents are essential to the project and benefit in many ways. We need private developers and investors to be successful and profitable. That’s how projects get built, where there is a win-win.

But Alaska’s Constitution and the promises made at statehood were clear that our resources should be developed for the maximum benefit of the (all!) people of Alaska. Our first responsibility is not to maximize returns for project developers. Our first responsibility is to ensure that any project we support creates lasting value for Alaskans today and for future generations, and at Statehood, that meant raising as much revenue from our resources as possible to minimize the federal burden, not cutting our established revenue options simply because a developer asks to pay less.

Of course we can’t cook the goose that lays golden eggs, but neither should we be content to have a goose we can pet and feed, gathering up its warm down while watching the golden eggs roll away from us.

Over the last twelve years, I’ve worked with hundreds of entrepreneurs, startups, and new ventures. One lesson stands out: good ideas deserve enthusiasm, but they also deserve due diligence. Project promoters naturally present the best version of their project and want to justify the maximum investment at the lowest cost, minimum dilution, and no obligations of control. That’s their job.

My job as an investor and fund manager was different, as it is in this role as a legislator. My responsibility in both cases has been to understand the assumptions, identify the risks, examine the missing steps, and determine whether the project is truly investable, needs all of the funds requested, at the terms desired, and in the end capable of delivering what it promises.

Alaska has spent decades chasing big ideas that were supposed to transform our future. Some succeeded. Many did not. We can no longer afford to approach major projects with wishful thinking. We’ve spent down much of the financial cushion that once allowed us to absorb mistakes, and we’ve allowed too many other practical opportunities to be delayed while waiting for a single transformative solution.

This project is too important to get wrong, and right now there are a lot potential risks and benefits for Alaskans.

My goal is to ensure that as we move forward, we do so with clear eyes, realistic assumptions, and a structure that supports good projects and strengthens Alaska’s long-term fiscal and economic future.

What Could Go Right?

The key question for policymakers isn’t whether the benefits of the gas pipeline project are possible—they are. The challenge is determining what policy and tax breaks are necessary for the right balance of how the value flows to Alaskans versus project investors, how much risk Alaska assumes to obtain those benefits, and whether the project structure maximizes potential for developer success and long-term benefits to the state and its people.

• Long-Term Energy Security for Southcentral Alaska Reliable natural gas supply for home heating and electricity generation.
  Reduced risk of Cook Inlet gas shortages and emergency LNG imports.
• Lower and More Stable Energy Costs Greater gas supply could help moderate future heating and power costs.
  Reduced exposure to volatile imported fuel prices.
• New State Revenue Royalties, production taxes, corporate income taxes, and other revenues from increased North Slope gas production.
  Revenue diversification beyond oil.
• Local Government Revenue Property tax revenue or Alternative Volumetric Taxes and other payments to boroughs and communities along the corridor.
  Funding for schools, roads, public safety, and local services
• Construction Jobs and Business Activity Thousands of temporary construction jobs.
  Significant opportunities for Alaska contractors, suppliers, transportation companies, and support industries.
• Permanent Operations Employment Long-term jobs operating the pipeline, gas treatment plant, LNG facilities, and associated infrastructure.
• New Industrial Development Affordable gas could support projects such as data centers, mining, petrochemicals, fertilizers, hydrogen, ammonia, and other manufacturing.
  Greater economic diversification if businesses choose to locate in Alaska.
• Increased North Slope Production A gas market may improve the economics of existing oil fields and future development.
  Additional investment in North Slope infrastructure.
• Strategic and Geopolitical Benefits Strengthened energy relationships with Asian allies and trading partners.
  Additional U.S. LNG export capacity from the Pacific Basin.
• Infrastructure Legacy Roads, ports, workforce training, communications systems, man camp utility modules, and utility improvements that remain after construction.
  Potential foundation for future economic development along the corridor.
• Population and Workforce Growth More jobs and business opportunities could attract and retain working-age Alaskans.
  Increased economic activity may help stabilize communities experiencing population decline.
• A Positive Signal to Investors Demonstrates Alaska can successfully deliver large-scale infrastructure projects.
  Could improve confidence for future investments in energy, mining, transportation, and manufacturing.

What Could Go Wrong?

The central policy risk is not necessarily that the project fails outright. A more likely concern is we have not derisked or removed unnecessary barriers so that the project either continues to consume time, energy and money, but does not proceed while other opportunities are ignored; or it succeeds technically and gets built, but Alaska receives significantly less benefit than expected relative to the risks, concessions, and opportunity costs incurred along the way.

• State Fiscal Opportunity Costs Public resources, staff time, political attention, and financial incentives are concentrated on the project.
  Other economic development priorities receive less support.
  We spend another 10 years supporting the project but nothing is developed.
• Short Term Budget Cuts – We have to make more cuts to education, pdf, and capital projects to support the gas line project construction phase before we have any new revenue.
• Cook Inlet Gas development shuts down, or is under invested, and the related support industries close and expertise leaves the state, but then we determine we need it back.
• Cost Overruns Construction costs exceed estimates by billions of dollars.
  Additional concessions, subsidies, or public support are requested to keep the project viable.
• Failure to Secure Customers LNG buyers do not sign sufficient long-term contracts and phase 2 does not proceed.
  The project is built with lower-than-expected utilization, reducing revenues.
• Global Market Changes LNG prices fall due to competing projects, oversupply, or lower demand.
  Competing energy technologies become more attractive.
• Limited State Revenue Tax incentives, deductions, or low project profitability result in less revenue than expected.
  Alaska bears costs and risks without receiving proportional benefits.
  Incentives for a gasline become new norms for existing and future projects and reduce future natural resource revenue potential
• Reduced Local Government Revenue Property tax reductions or Alternative Volumetric Tax restructuring limit expected revenues to boroughs and communities.
  Communities experience impacts without sufficient funding to address them.
  Incentives for a gasline become new norms for existing and future projects and reduce future natural resource revenue potential
• Southcentral Gas Costs Remain High Even with a pipeline, delivered gas prices may not be substantially lower as expected.
  Ratepayers continue facing higher heating and electricity costs.
• Construction Boom–Bust Cycle Temporary economic activity is followed by a sharp decline when construction ends.
  Communities and businesses expand for the boom but struggle afterward.
• Crowding Out Other Energy Investments Focus on the gasline delays or reduces investment in transmission, efficiency, renewables, storage, Bradley Lake upgrades, geothermal, or other energy solutions.
  Alaska ends up with fewer energy options if the project stalls.
• Industrial Development Does Not Materialize Assumed new demand from mines, data centers, fertilizer plants, or manufacturing projects never develops.
  Pipeline capacity remains underutilized.
• Community Impacts Exceed Benefits Housing shortages, infrastructure strain, workforce disruptions, or environmental impacts occur during construction.
  Mitigation funding proves insufficient or drains state and federal support.
  We repeat the mistakes of the TAPS project that we had promised not to squander if we got a second chance.
• Financing or Ownership Changes Ownership structures evolve in ways that reduce Alaska’s influence or future benefit.
  Financial stress leads to refinancing, asset sales, or restructuring.
• Project Delays Permitting, financing, labor, supply chain, or market issues push completion years beyond expectations.
  Southcentral gas supply concerns remain unresolved during the delay.
• Asset Underperformance The project operates below design capacity for long periods.
  Revenue projections fail to support the original investment assumptions.
  Alaska Permanent Fund investment under performs or is lost.
• Erosion of Public Trust Expectations are raised beyond what the project ultimately delivers.
  Public confidence in future large infrastructure or resource development projects is damaged.
• Stranded Asset Risk Long-term shifts in global energy demand, technology, or policy reduce utilization before the project has fully recovered its investment.
  Investors, communities, or governments face lower-than-expected returns.

The question is not whether I support development. The question is whether this project needs and benefits from a significant tax break, and does that lost revenue change the trajectory of the project in a meaningful way for the benefit of house district 9, all Alaskans today and, future generations.

That’s the standard our Constitution demands, and it’s the standard Alaskans deserve.

Ky